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Summary 28 
Source attribution and microbial risk assessment methods have been widely applied for the 29 
control of several foodborne pathogens worldwide by identifying i) the most important pathogen 30 
sources, and ii) the risk represented by specific foods and the critical points in these foods’ 31 
production chain for microbial control. Such evidence has proved crucial for risk managers to 32 
identify and prioritize effective food safety and public health strategies. In the context of 33 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) from livestock and pets, the utility of these methods is 34 
recognized but a number of challenges have largely prevented their application and routine use. 35 
One key challenge has been to define the hazard in question: is it the antimicrobial drug use in 36 
animals, the antimicrobial resistant bacteria in animals and foods, or the antimicrobial resistant 37 
genes that can be transferred between commensal and pathogenic bacteria in the animal or human 38 
gut or in the environment? Other important limitations include the lack of occurrence and 39 
transmission data, and the lack of evidence to inform dose-response relationships. We present the 40 
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main principles, available methods, strengths and weaknesses of source attribution and risk 41 
assessment methods, discuss their utility to identify sources and estimate risks of AMR from 42 
livestock and pets, and provide an overview of conducted studies. In addition, we discuss 43 
remaining challenges and current and future opportunities to improve methods and knowledge on 44 
the sources and transmission routes of AMR from animals through food, direct contact or the 45 
environment, including due to improvements in surveillance and developments on genotypic 46 
typing methods.    47 
 48 
1. Introduction 49 
Antimicrobial use in humans and animals has been identified as a main driver of AMR, and 50 
bacteria harboring resistance to antimicrobials can be found in humans, animals, foods and the 51 
environment. As a consequence, humans can be exposed to antimicrobial resistantbacteria 52 
through a wide range of sources and transmission pathways. To inform policies aimed at 53 
reducing the burden of AMR from animals and foods, risk managers need evidence on the most 54 
important sources and transmission routes, and the critical points throughout the production chain 55 
for the prevention and control of AMR. While this process is complex and deeply reliant on the 56 
integration of surveillance data from humans, animals and foods, it is supported by scientific 57 
disciplines that have evolved rapidly in the last decades, including source attribution and 58 
quantitative risk assessment. 59 
Source attribution is a relatively new discipline that has been developed to assist risk managers to 60 
identify and prioritize effective food safety intervention measures. It is defined as the partitioning 61 
of the human disease burden of one or more foodborne illnesses to specific sources, where the 62 
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term source includes reservoirs and vehicles (1). A variety of source attribution methods is 63 
available to estimate the relative contribution of different reservoirs or vehicles of foodborne 64 
pathogens, including methods relying on data on the occurrence of the pathogen in sources and 65 
humans, epidemiological studies, intervention studies or expert elicitations. These methods have 66 
been applied to inform food safety policy-making at national or international level, particularly to 67 
inform Salmonella and Campylobacter intervention strategies (see e.g. (2–6)). Source attribution 68 
methods differ in their approaches and data requirements, and as a consequence they attribute 69 
disease at different points along the food chain (points of attribution), i.e. at the point of reservoir 70 
(e.g. animal production stage, environment emissions) or point of exposure (end of the 71 
transmission chain) (Figure 1). The application and utility of each method, therefore, depends on 72 
the risk management question being addressed and on the availability of data.  73 
 74 
Figure 1. Routes of transmission of zoonotic pathogens and points of source attribution. Adapted 75 
from (7). 76 
Microbial risk assessment  is a systematic and science-based approach to estimate the risk of 77 
microbial hazards in the production-to-consumption chain (8, 9). Microbial risk assessment can 78 
be used to detect critical control points along the food chain and for the assessment of control and 79 
intervention strategies. It is a well-established discipline that has been widely applied to estimate 80 
the risk of an extensive variety of pathogen-food commodity pairs, and it is also systematically 81 
applied to inform food safety risk management in many countries and international bodies such 82 
as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (e.g. (10–12)). In coordination with source 83 
attribution studies, it is particularly useful to focus on the production chain of the most important 84 
source(s) of the hazard of interest (as identified in the source attribution step), identify the steps 85 
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in the food chain that are critical for hazard control, and identify and suggest strategies for 86 
reduction of the risk to humans. 87 
While source attribution and risk assessment have been widely used to provide evidence that can 88 
support strategies to reduce the burden of a number of foodborne pathogens, the transmission and 89 
spread of pathogens carrying resistance to antimicrobials adds an extra layer of complexity to this 90 
integrated food safety paradigm. On one hand, virtually any foodborne pathogen can acquire 91 
resistance to antimicrobials, which may lead to prolonged and more severe disease and even be 92 
life-threatening, when antimicrobial therapy is required but fails to succeed due to resistance 93 
towards the prescribed drug(s). On the other hand, the potential transfer of antimicrobial 94 
resistance genes (i.e. the gene(s) carrying the resistance trait) between pathogenic and commensal 95 
bacteria in the human gut can amplify the public health impact of foodborne AMR (13). As a 96 
consequence, it is not only challenging to estimate the direct risk posed by resistant foodborne 97 
pathogens, but also to quantify the relative contribution to risk of the transfer of AMR genes, e.g. 98 
from commensals originating from animal reservoirs to human pathogens.  99 
This chapter describes the overall concepts and methods within source attribution and microbial 100 
risk assessment, provides the state-of-the art of their application in the area of AMR, and 101 
discusses current challenges and future perspectives for the development of methods to inform 102 
policies to reduce the disease burden of AMR in human populations. 103 
2. Source attribution 104 
2.1. Source attribution of antimicrobial resistance 105 
The purpose of applying source attribution methods to antimicrobial resistant pathogens (i.e. a 106 
pathogen that has acquired resistance to at least one antimicrobial drug) or AMR genes is to 107 
6 
 
identify the most important sources and transmission routes for human exposure to AMR. It is 108 
widely recognized that one of the main drivers of resistance in zoonotic bacteria is antimicrobial 109 
use in livestock production (i.e. in the reservoirs) (14). Identifying the most important reservoirs 110 
for human exposure to AMR is hence critical to direct policy making aimed at reducing 111 
antimicrobial use at the primary production level. In addition, knowledge on the transmission 112 
routes from reservoirs to humans is crucial for the prioritization of risk management along the 113 
food chain. 114 
While a range of source attribution methods attributing disease to the original reservoirs or to 115 
exposure routes of foodborne pathogens exists, only a few studies have applied these in the 116 
context of AMR, and the relative importance of transmission pathways of resistance remains a 117 
critical knowledge gap.  118 
Challenges of applying source attribution methods for AMR include the fact that virtually any 119 
pathogen can become resistant to antimicrobials and that most zoonotic pathogens can be 120 
transmitted to humans via a variety of foodborne and non-foodborne routes. Thus far, source 121 
attribution typically focused on a single pathogen (e.g. Salmonella or Escherichia coli), and on 122 
resistance profiles found among that pathogen in different sources (15–17). In addition, 123 
antimicrobial resistance genes  are often located on plasmids, which can be transferred between 124 
bacterial species (plasmid-mediated horizontal gene transfer) and therefore also from commensal 125 
bacteria to human pathogens (e.g. Klebsiella spp.). Focusing on a single bacterial species is 126 
therefore likely to underestimate the overall exposure and thus the risk posed by AMR.   127 
To address this challenge, source attribution of the AMR determinant may be more efficient. 128 
Such studies require knowledge and data on the prevalence, abundance and transmission of 129 
genes, and on horizontal gene transfer rates, which is still being gathered (e.g. in the European 130 
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Union project EFFORT - Ecology from Farm to Fork Of microbial drug Resistance and 131 
Transmission; http://www.effort-against-amr.eu/). 132 
2.2. Existing source attribution approaches 133 
2.2.1. Microbial subtyping 134 
The microbial subtyping approach involves characterization of the hazard by subtyping methods 135 
(e.g., phenotypic or genotypic subtyping of bacterial strains), and the principle is to compare the 136 
subtypes of isolates from different sources (e.g. animals, food) with the subtypes isolated from 137 
humans. The subtyping approach attributes illness at the point of reservoir and is enabled by the 138 
identification of strong associations between some of the dominant subtypes and a specific 139 
reservoir or source, providing a heterogeneous distribution of subtypes among the sources (1).  140 
Microbial subtyping methods for source attribution include frequency matched models and 141 
population genetic models. While the frequency matched methods are based on the comparison 142 
of human strain types and the distribution of those types in the sources, the population genetic 143 
models are based on modelling the organism’s evolutionary history (18). In the frequency-144 
matched models, subtypes exclusively or almost exclusively isolated from one source are 145 
regarded as indicators for the human health impact of that particular source, assuming that all 146 
human cases caused by these subtypes originate only from that source. Human cases of disease 147 
caused by subtypes found in several reservoirs are then distributed relative to the prevalence of 148 
the indicator types (2, 3, 19). Population genetics approaches use genotyping data to infer 149 
evolutionary and clonal relationships among different strains, including the occurrence of novel 150 
(combinations of) alleles in strains from humans that are unobserved in source populations (20). 151 
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All microbial subtyping models require a collection of temporally and spatially related isolates 152 
from various sources, and thus are facilitated by an integrated foodborne disease surveillance 153 
programme providing a collection of isolates from the major animal reservoirs of foodborne 154 
diseases. These models do not require prevalence data, and can rely on the distribution of the 155 
isolates’ subtypes in the different sources and in humans. 156 
Either type of models has been applied to attribute foodborne pathogens to sources in a variety of 157 
countries. Microbial subtyping approaches have been particularly successful to attribute 158 
Salmonella and Campylobacter infections (see e.g. (3, 21–24)). The method has also been 159 
applied to other pathogens (namely Listeria monocytogenes and shiga toxin-producing 160 
Escherichia coli (25, 26)), even though less frequently due to lack of available surveillance data 161 
in most countries.  162 
The microbial subtyping approach has seldom been used to estimate the relative contribution of 163 
sources of antimicrobial resistant pathogens to AMR in humans. To our knowledge, two 164 
frequency-matched studies have been conducted, both using antimicrobial susceptibility patterns 165 
as a typing method for Salmonella (15, 16). Both studies demonstrate that AMR data can be used 166 
to characterize pathogen subtypes in a microbial subtyping source-attribution model, and discuss 167 
its utility in terms of discriminatory power, but do not focus on the source origin of specific AMR 168 
genes.  169 
Microbial subtyping methods are recognized as one of the most robust data-driven methods for 170 
source attribution. They have the advantage of attributing illness to the reservoirs of the 171 
pathogens, thus informing risk-management strategies closest possible to the original sources and 172 
preventing further spread to other routes or sources of transmission (1). Another advantage of this 173 
approach is that it does not require data on the prevalence and concentration of the pathogen in 174 
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the different sources (which is often difficult to obtain), or on the exposure frequency in the 175 
population. Still, these methods are often limited by the requirement of comparable subtyping 176 
data originating from an operative integrated surveillance of human cases and food/animals. In 177 
addition, the methods cannot distinguish between different transmission routes from a specific 178 
animal reservoir to humans.  179 
2.2.2. Comparative exposure assessment  180 
Comparative exposure assessments determine the relative importance of the known transmission 181 
routes by estimating the human exposure to the hazard (e.g. pathogen) via each route. For each 182 
known transmission route, this approach requires information on the prevalence and/or 183 
dose/concentration of the pathogen in the source, of the changes of the prevalence and quantity of 184 
the pathogen throughout the transmission chain, and of the frequency at which humans are 185 
exposed by that route (e.g. consumption data). Exposure doses are then compared, and the 186 
relative contribution of each of the various transmission routes to human exposure in the 187 
population is estimated, proportionally to the size of each exposure dose.  188 
The data requirements of the comparative exposure assessment approach will depend on the 189 
overall transmission groups considered in the model (i.e. foodborne, environmental and/or 190 
contact with animals), as well as on the point in the transmission chain where the “origin” of the 191 
pathogen is set. In general, contamination data for each source, information on the main steps in 192 
the transmission chain and data on the effects of these on contamination, and exposure data are 193 
needed. If transmission via contact with live animals is considered, the exposure model needs to 194 
be expanded and consider different possibilities for direct and indirect contact with a 195 
contaminated animal. 196 
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Exposure assessments have been used with different degrees of success to source attribute disease 197 
by several microbial agents, namely Listeria, Campylobacter, VTEC (and Toxoplasma gondii, 198 
and by chemical hazards - aflatoxins, cadmium and lead(27–34).  199 
In the context of AMR, this approach is particularly useful to address a widely-recognized 200 
knowledge gap, which is understanding the relative contribution of the exposure routes of AMR 201 
from animals to humans. Specifically, it can be used to estimate the relative importance of the 202 
food chain, companion animals and the environment for exposure of the general population to 203 
antimicrobial resistant bacteria or AMR genes. Thus far (and to our knowledge), two comparative 204 
exposure assessments have been applied to estimate the relative contribution of different types of 205 
meat to the exposure of consumers to extended spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL)/and AmpC 206 
beta-lactamases producing Escherichia coli in the Netherlands(17) and in Denmark (35). 207 
An important drawback of this approach is that, due to data limitations and gaps (e.g. in food 208 
preparation habits and the effect of these in the contamination of foods), exposure estimates for 209 
microbial pathogens are likely to present wide uncertainty intervals. Furthermore, in the context 210 
of AMR, these studies focus on specific antimicrobial resistant pathogens, and do not address all 211 
concomitant transmission routes contributing to overall transmission of resistance to humans (e.g. 212 
same AMR determinant present in other members of the meat bacterial community), which adds 213 
to the uncertainty of the relative exposure estimates. 214 
2.2.3. Epidemiological approaches  215 
Epidemiological approaches for source attribution include analyses of data from outbreak 216 
investigations and studies of sporadic infections; both approaches attribute illness at the point of 217 
exposure.  An outbreak is here defined as (1) the occurrence of two or more cases of a similar 218 
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illness resulting from the exposure to a common source (36), or (2) a situation in which the 219 
observed number of cases exceeds the expected number and where the cases are linked  to the 220 
same food source (37). Sporadic cases represent cases that have not been associated with known 221 
outbreaks (38). Even though outbreak-associated cases are more likely to be captured by public 222 
health surveillance systems, an unknown proportion of cases classified as sporadic may be part of 223 
undetected outbreaks.  224 
Many outbreak investigations are successful in identifying the specific contaminated source or 225 
ingredient causing human infections. A simple descriptive analysis or summary of outbreak 226 
investigations is useful for quantifying the relative contribution of different foods to outbreak 227 
illnesses. However, these implicated foods may be composed of multiple ingredients, and thus 228 
outbreak data does not always allow pinpointing the actual source of infection. Probabilistic 229 
models using outbreak data to estimate the total number of illnesses in the population attributable 230 
to different foods provide a useful way to generalize outbreak data to a broader population of 231 
foodborne illnesses. These models are not only used to generalize the results of outbreak 232 
investigations, but also to estimate the contaminated sources in composite or “complex” foods.  233 
Analyses of data from outbreak investigations benefit from detailed data on each reported 234 
outbreak, and require the adoption of a food categorization scheme for classification of 235 
implicated foods (see e.g.(39)). Composite foods will be assigned to two or more food categories 236 
depending on the number and nature of their ingredients. By assigning a probability to each 237 
ingredient corresponding to the likelihood that it was the source of the outbreak, outbreak data, 238 
including data about both simple and complex foods, can be used to attribute foodborne illnesses 239 
to sources. 240 
12 
 
Several analyses of outbreak data for source attribution have been published in recent years, most 241 
of them modelling (40–42) or summarizing (43, 44) data from multiple pathogens. The strength 242 
of this method is that it uses data that is readily available in many countries worldwide, and thus 243 
its use is not restricted to countries with integrated foodborne disease surveillance programmes. 244 
Also, it attributes foodborne illnesses at the point of exposure, which means that it is particularly 245 
useful to identify which foods (including processed foods) most frequently cause disease, as well 246 
as which risk factors contribute more for contamination of foods at the end of the food chain (e.g. 247 
cross contamination). This type of information is valuable to define interventions at the 248 
processing and consumption level, but does not provide evidence to inform risk management 249 
strategies at the origin of the pathogen (reservoirs). 250 
Several outbreaks caused by antimicrobial resistant pathogens have been reported and 251 
investigated in the last decades (see e.g. (45, 46)). A review of outbreak data has also been used 252 
for source attribution of antimicrobial resistant Salmonella in the United States, suggesting that 253 
antimicrobial susceptibility data on isolates from foodborne outbreaks can help determine which 254 
foods are associated with resistant infections (47). Even though few countries or regions are 255 
likely to have sufficient data for a robust source attribution analysis using AMR-related 256 
outbreaks, summarizing available information may provide evidence on the relative contribution 257 
of different foods for infection with antimicrobial resistant pathogens. 258 
Another epidemiological approach that can be used for source attribution of foodborne disease is 259 
the case control study of sporadic cases. Case-control studies are a valuable tool to identify 260 
potential risk factors for human illness, including sources and predisposing, behavioral or 261 
seasonal factors (48). In addition to individual case-control studies, a systematic review  of 262 
published case-control studies of sporadic infections of a given pathogen can provide an 263 
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overview of the relevant exposures and risk factors for that disease, and a summary of the 264 
estimated population attributable fractions for each exposure (49). A systematic review follows a 265 
rigorous search strategy to identify all potentially relevant peer-review case-control studies for a 266 
hazard, studies being conducted in a variety of countries and time periods, designed with 267 
different settings, and potentially focused on specific age groups within the population. A meta-268 
analysis is then performed to compare and combine information from different studies. To do 269 
this, risk factors may be stratified according to source-categorization schemes, location of 270 
exposures and, if appropriate, frequency of exposure. An overall population attributable fraction 271 
derived from a meta-analysis or weighted summary of several case-control studies of a certain 272 
hazard can be combined with estimates of the burden of disease caused by that hazard to estimate 273 
the burden of disease attributed to each exposure. 274 
This method is particularly useful for hazards that do not frequently cause outbreaks but that have 275 
been extensively studied (50). In addition, it is valuable to attribute illness at a regional or global 276 
level when data are scarce in most countries. A number of case-control studies have been 277 
conducted to investigate risk factors for infection with foodborne pathogens resistant to 278 
antimicrobials (see e.g. (51, 52)). However, the utility of a meta-analysis of case-control studies 279 
to investigate the relative contribution of different sources and risk factors for infection with 280 
antimicrobial resistant pathogens may be limited if a low number of case-control studies focused 281 
on specific antimicrobial resistant pathogens  or AMR genes has been conducted.  282 
2.2.4. Other approaches  283 
Other approaches for source attribution of foodborne pathogens include intervention studies and 284 
expert elicitations. Intervention studies are large-scale, well-structured prospective studies that 285 
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are specifically tailored to evaluate direct impacts of a specific intervention on the risk of disease 286 
in a population. While they would be the gold-standard of an attribution study, they have the 287 
disadvantages of being resource-demanding, expensive, and difficult to implement because other 288 
concurrent factors may affect occurrence of disease.  289 
Expert elicitations can be designed as structured methods to gather and analyze knowledge from 290 
experts, which are communicated with a measure of uncertainty. They are particularly useful to 291 
attribute the burden of foodborne diseases to main transmission pathways (i.e. foodborne, 292 
environmental, direct contact), for which data-driven methods are typically insufficient(50). 293 
There are numerous methods used for expert elicitation, including methods that are based upon 294 
iteration and finding consensus among a small group of experts (e.g. the Delphi method). Expert 295 
judgments are subjective by nature and may be biased by the specific background and scientific 296 
expertise of the respondents, and several methods to evaluate the expert’s performance have been 297 
described. Several expert elicitation studies have been conducted for source attribution of 298 
foodborne disease (e.g. Havelaar et al. 2008; Ravel et al. 2010). The World Health Organization’s 299 
Initiative to Estimate the Global Burden of Foodborne Diseases (WHO-FERG) has undertaken a 300 
large-scale and successful expert elicitation to attribute disease by 19 foodborne hazards to main 301 
transmission groups at a global, regional and sub-regional level (55). The study applied 302 
structured expert judgment using Cooke’s Classical Model (56) to obtain estimates for the 303 
relative contributions of different transmission pathways for several foodborne hazards.  304 
2.3. Applications and results 305 
Despite the increased recognition of the importance of source attribution of foodborne pathogens 306 
to direct risk management strategies, and the growing use of these approaches in several countries 307 
15 
 
and research groups, source attribution of AMR is still in its infancy. There are few published 308 
examples of the different methods here described, and the identified challenges are still being 309 
addressed. The two microbial subtyping studies published are both frequency-matched studies 310 
that used antimicrobial susceptibility patterns as a typing method for Salmonella (15, 16). These 311 
studies use AMR profiles as a typing method (i.e. to characterize pathogen subtypes) but do not 312 
focus on the source origin of specific AMR genes. Still, they are able to estimate the distribution 313 
of AMR in human cases attributed to different sources, as is done routinely in the Salmonella 314 
source attribution activities in Denmark (57). Similarly, the two comparative exposure 315 
assessments that have been applied to estimate the relative contribution of different types of meat 316 
to the exposure of consumers to AMR have focused on the same causative agent, this time 317 
extended spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL)/and AmpC beta-lactamases producing Escherichia 318 
coli (17, 35). These studies demonstrate that the method could be extended to other countries and 319 
agents. The recent review of outbreak data for source attribution of antimicrobial resistant 320 
Salmonella in the United States suggests that antimicrobial susceptibility data on isolates from 321 
foodborne outbreaks can help determine which foods are associated with resistant infections (47). 322 
This method could be applied in countries that have sufficient data, or to regional data in an 323 
attempt to gather information from multiple countries. Numerous epidemiological studies of 324 
sporadic infections (case-control or cohort studies) investigating risk factors for of antimicrobial 325 
resistant infections in humans demonstrate these methods usefulness to identify routes of AMR 326 
(e.g. (58–60). While their use focusing on foodborne or direct or indirect contact to animals’ 327 
transmission has been limited, available studies still provide information for food safety risk 328 
management (51, 52). 329 
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2.4. Strengths and weaknesses 330 
Source attribution of AMR genes and of antimicrobial resistant pathogens is a research area 331 
under active development. The application of the methods here described remains a challenge, for 332 
reasons that depend on each method considered.  333 
For the application of subtyping frequency-matched studies, two of the main challenges are the 334 
limited availability of animal, food and human AMR data from established surveillance systems, 335 
and the difficulty to define number of antimicrobial resistance profiles highly specific to a 336 
particular source/transmission route, a cornerstone of this method. Furthermore, the fact that the 337 
method does not determine the actual transmission route from each specific reservoir to humans 338 
represents another limitation for the use of frequency-matched models. Due to the public health 339 
need for understanding the transmission of AMR, population genetics approaches may eventually 340 
be a good complement to frequency-matched models, especially considering the increasing 341 
availability of whole genome sequencing and metagenomics data, which describe occurrence of 342 
AMR genes in populations. For instance, population genetics can help identifying reservoir-343 
specific AMR genes’ patterns that can then be used in frequency-matched models. New 344 
generation sequencing data may also contribute to unravel details that contribute to a more 345 
accurate source-attribution, such as the evolution of AMR patterns over time in different sources, 346 
and resistance in humans that is not transmitted from animals or foods. 347 
While single genomics and metagenomics may support the development of novel subtyping 348 
source-attribution methods, they may hinder the application of comparative exposure assessment. 349 
Information on prevalence and quantity of AMR genes or antimicrobial resistant pathogens in 350 
each source, as well as their changes throughout the transmission chain, are difficult to assess 351 
from those data and impaired by a high degree of uncertainty. 352 
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Epidemiological methods of source-attribution, e.g. based on outbreak investigation, have the 353 
advantage of not relying on a sophisticated, data abundant and integrated surveillance system, 354 
encompassing animal reservoirs, foods and humans. However, they require consistent AMR 355 
investigation on food sources and human cases, based at least on bacterial isolation and 356 
phenotypic susceptibility testing. Eventually, new generation sequencing may overtake 357 
traditional diagnostic methods in outbreak investigation (14, 61), which will also require 358 
modification of the current epidemiological approaches. 359 
Intervention studies have, in the context of AMR, the same limitations as when applied to 360 
bacterial pathogens. It is difficult to evaluate the exact impact of a specific intervention (e.g. 361 
reducing antimicrobial use at the farm level) on the population where disease is attributed (e.g. 362 
AMR occurrence in humans). Control measures that reduced antimicrobial use in primary 363 
production have been successfully implemented with the aim of reducing AMR in animals (e.g. 364 
the antimicrobial growth promoter intervention, the voluntary ban on the use of cephalosporins 365 
and the yellow card antimicrobial scheme in swine herds in Denmark (62–64)). However, to 366 
assess the real success of such measures in terms of public health impact, it is necessary to collect 367 
data prior to and following the intervention (14), at all dimensions of AMR transmission to 368 
humans, i.e. also including other transmission routes such as environment and antimicrobial use 369 
in humans. 370 
   371 
18 
 
3. Risk assessment 372 
3.1. Microbial Risk Assessment (MRA) of antimicrobial resistance 373 
Risk assessment is the process of estimating the likelihood that exposure to a biological, chemical 374 
or physical hazard will result in an adverse health effect in exposed individuals. Microbial risk 375 
assessment has been established as a part of the food safety risk analysis paradigm by 376 
international and national bodies in the last decades, with harmonized guidelines being proposed 377 
and widely adopted worldwide (8, 65). In the context of AMR, risk assessments are useful to 378 
inform regulatory decision making for the mitigation of potential health consequences in both 379 
humans and animals (66). While the importance and need for AMR risk assessments have been 380 
recognized for decades (67), its application has been complicated by several knowledge gaps. 381 
Challenges of the development of AMR risk assessment include: 382 
 The nature of the hazard is difficult to identify and will determine the nature of the 383 
adverse consequence of the exposure. In the context of AMR risk assessment, different 384 
hazards can be considered (68, 69). For example, Salisbury et al.(2017) (68)discussed 385 
three interrelated hazards that can be assessed separately: the antimicrobial drug, the 386 
antimicrobial resistantbacteria, and the AMR determinant, leading to three different health 387 
consequences, respectively -   development of resistance, infection and treatment failure 388 
and transference of resistance. Similarly, Manaia (2017)(69) describes that resistome-389 
associated risks have been discussed considering the microbial community, the genome 390 
and transmission of resistance.  391 
 The nature of the risk posed by antimicrobial use and AMR to human health is inherently 392 
complex and logically linked to the nature of the hazard, as mentioned above. In other 393 
words, while the likelihood that humans will be infected by pathogens that are resistant to 394 
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one or several antimicrobials can be estimated, the resulting adverse health consequences 395 
can be one or several of the following:  development of disease due to infection with the 396 
pathogen; failure of treatment of the infection due to resistance to the used drug(s); and 397 
spread of AMR genes to commensal bacteria in the human host (which can amplify the 398 
risk and extend the impact of an isolated exposure in time).  399 
 There are numerous factors in the process of selection and spread of resistance in bacterial 400 
populations, between and within animal species, humans and the environment, and within 401 
different bacterial populations in those same reservoirs. These factors include the several 402 
drivers for the emergence and spread of AMR in the food production, specifically at the 403 
farm. At this level, antimicrobial use is recognized as the most important driver, but not 404 
always necessary (if for example co-resistance and co-selection occur), and not always 405 
sufficient; additional drivers are e.g. poor prevention and control of infectious diseases 406 
leading to increased antimicrobial use and the spread of clones that have established 407 
themselves in the herd/environment, and keep selective pressure, even if antimicrobial use 408 
is interrupted. These factors, among many others, influence the development of exposure 409 
assessment in microbial risk assessment. 410 
 Additionally to the challenges described above, estimating the likelihood of adverse 411 
health effects, given exposure to an antimicrobial resistant pathogen or determinant, is 412 
difficult due to the absence of a well-defined dose-response effect for AMR, and the 413 
existence of various possibilities of adverse effect. 414 
Recognizing the need for AMR risk assessments to identify strategies aimed at preventing and 415 
reducing the disease burden of AMR transmitted through foods, a number of reviews and 416 
scientific articles have proposed frameworks for such risk assessments in the late 90’s and early 417 
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2000’s (67, 68, 70). Even though such proposals were comprehensive and structured to address 418 
the challenges identified at that time, they were not widely adopted, mostly due to remaining 419 
knowledge and data gaps in the AMR transmission and impact. More recent frameworks apply 420 
current available data and either are mostly qualitative or semi-quantitative  (see e.g. (71, 72)), 421 
take a linear approach (e.g. (73)), and/or focus on marketing authorization applications for 422 
antimicrobial veterinary medicinal products for use in food producing species (74). 423 
 424 
3.2. Description of the four steps of microbial risk assessment focusing on AMR 425 
The microbial risk assessment process is, as described by the Codex Alimentarius guidelines (8), 426 
constituted by four main components: hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure 427 
assessment and risk characterization.  428 
In an AMR risk assessment, the hazard can be the antimicrobial drug, the antimicrobial resistant 429 
pathogen or the AMR determinant. Ultimately, the identification of the hazard of interest will 430 
depend of the risk-assessment question to be addressed. In a traditional microbial risk assessment 431 
(i.e. focused on a pathogen-food pair, without considering resistance to antimicrobial drugs) the 432 
hazard identification step consists of the qualitative description of the hazard, including the 433 
evaluation of the presence of the pathogen in a food product available for consumption in a 434 
population and the host interface (types of disease caused, susceptible populations). In the context 435 
of AMR, this step is complicated by a number of factors: i) selection of resistance in a pathogen 436 
can occur by multiple mechanisms (namely mutation and horizontal gene transfer of mobile 437 
genetic elements containing AMR genes (HGT)) (75); ii) one or more genes may be necessary for 438 
development of AMR; iii) AMR genes can be located in chromosomal or extra-chromossomal 439 
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DNA such as plasmids (75), and iv) several bacterial species or strains can harbor and serve as a 440 
reservoir for resistance.  441 
The hazard characterization step of a risk assessment consists of the review and collection of 442 
information on the relationship between the dose of the hazard and the onset of disease in the 443 
exposed individuals (i.e. infectious dose), and the relationship between different doses and the 444 
probability of occurrence of disease (i.e. dose-response). The response of a human population to 445 
exposure to a foodborne pathogen is highly variable, reflecting the fact that the incidence of 446 
disease is dependent on a variety of factors such as the virulence characteristics of the pathogen, 447 
the numbers of cells ingested, the general health and immune status of the hosts, and the 448 
attributes of the food that alter microbial-host interaction (76). Thus, the likelihood that any 449 
individual becomes ill due to an exposure to a foodborne pathogen is dependent on the 450 
integration of host, pathogen, and food matrix effects. Again, in AMR risk assessment, the 451 
required data to assess a dose-response relationship will depend on the hazard considered; it can 452 
be one of the three: dose level of the antimicrobial for observing resistance usually expressed by 453 
minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) breakpoint (75), or any other factor that can affect the 454 
development or amplification of resistance, the dose of the pathogen needed to cause disease, or 455 
any factor related to the stability and transfer potential of the AMR gene in a bacterial population 456 
(68). 457 
In the exposure assessment step, the likelihood that an individual or a population will be exposed 458 
to a hazard and the numbers of the microorganism that are likely to be ingested are estimated 459 
(77). The exposure assessment requires data on the prevalence and concentration of the hazard in 460 
the food source(s), as well as information on the potential changes of the pathogen load 461 
throughout the food processing chain (e.g. growth, reduction) (78); in addition, it requires data on 462 
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the frequency and amount of food consumed by individuals of the population. As mentioned 463 
above, numerous factors influence the process of selection and spread of resistance, consequently 464 
influencing the final exposure of the consumer to AMR genes or antimicrobial resistant 465 
pathogens. These factors are either still unknown or there are limited data reporting their 466 
influence on AMR transmission throughout the food chain. 467 
In the last component of a risk assessment, risk characterization, the final risk to the consumer is 468 
estimated by integrating the previous three components. Specifically, the measure of exposure 469 
(i.e. the likely dose an individual is exposed to in a given food consumption/exposure event) is 470 
integrated with the dose-response relationship to estimate the likelihood of adverse health effect. 471 
In the context of AMR microbial risk assessment, even after an appropriate definition of the risk 472 
question and the targeted hazard identification (which determine the adverse effect to be 473 
assessed), and the estimation of the likelihood of exposure to the hazard of interest, 474 
characterizing the risk in the absence of an appropriate and comprehensive hazard 475 
characterization step remains a challenge. A “dose-response” step becomes particularly 476 
demanding when “dose” at exposure is expressed in genotypic terms (by use of genomics or 477 
metagenomics AMR data) and “response” must be expressed in phenotypic terms (e.g. 478 
expression of resistance in a pathogen or horizontal transfer of an AMR gene between 479 
commensal and pathogenic bacteria). 480 
3.3. Applications and results  481 
A number of risk assessments focused on specific antimicrobial resistant pathogens-food/animal 482 
pairs have been conducted since the publication of the different proposed guidelines. These 483 
include qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assessments, performed by food 484 
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authorities, academia or industry. Here we provide examples of the three-types of risk assessment 485 
that have been important to highlight the challenges and limitations they still face, the 486 
applications of their results and the need for further studies.   487 
Qualitative risk assessments 488 
One of the first studies published assessed the health impact of residues of antibacterial and anti-489 
parasitic drugs in foods of animal origin and was published over two decades ago (79). It was a 490 
qualitative and comprehensive review that focused on residues of a variety of drugs in multiple 491 
foods, and an important step for the recognition of several of the challenges described in this 492 
chapter. More drug- and pathogen-focused qualitative assessments have been conducted since 493 
then, including in recent years, such as the qualitative risk assessment focused on Methicillin 494 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)  conducted by a multi-sectorial and interdisciplinary 495 
expert group in Denmark (80). This study is a good example of an applied risk assessment, 496 
conducted upon request from the food and veterinary authorities with the aims of 1) assessing the 497 
risk of livestock MRSA based on the existing knowledge and the results of veterinary screening 498 
studies conducted in herds, and 2) providing recommendation for control measures to reduce the 499 
spread of MRSA from the affected herds to the surrounding environment and community. The 500 
method consisted of a comprehensive evaluation of all available data on the prevalence of MRSA 501 
in animals and humans, as well as on the risk factors for infection by livestock MRSA from the 502 
environment, from meat, from occupational activities (e.g. risk for slaughterhouse or farm 503 
workers) and from the community. The risk assessment consisted of a descriptive evaluation of 504 
the risk of these types of transmission in the Danish population. 505 
Another recent study has applied the risk assessment framework developed by the European 506 
Medicines Agency (74) to assess the AMR risk to public health due to use of antimicrobials in 507 
24 
 
pigs, using pleuromutilins as an example (81). Livestock-associated methicillin-resistant 508 
Staphylococcus aureus of clonal complex 398 (MRSA CC398) and enterococci were identified as 509 
relevant hazards. This framework followed the International Organization for Animal Health’s 510 
(OIE) approach to risk assessment and consisted of four steps describing the risk pathway, 511 
combined into a risk estimate. The study applied a qualitative approach, where the output of each 512 
step was defined in a scale. Likewise, the level of uncertainty was described qualitatively in the 513 
different steps and the output (as high, medium or low). The authors discuss the value of 514 
mathematical modeling as a tool to simulate pathways and identifying ways of reducing 515 
resistance. Still, they stress that the relationship between reducing consumption of antibiotics and 516 
reducing resistance is not necessarily linear, and defend that this relationship needs to be better 517 
established for modeling to have full value (81). Despite the fact that this study is recent at the 518 
point of writing of this chapter and thus could build on all newly available evidence on AMR 519 
mechanisms, it still dealt with substantial data and knowledge gaps that enhanced uncertainty 520 
around outputs (81). 521 
Another example of a qualitative assessment is the WHO’s list of Critically Important 522 
Antimicrobials (71). The list applies criteria to rank antimicrobials according to their relative 523 
importance in human medicine. The purpose of this assessment is to provide clinicians, 524 
regulatory agencies, policy-makers and other stakeholders’ information to develop risk 525 
management strategies for the use of antimicrobials in food production animals globally. The first 526 
WHO list of Critically Important Antimicrobials was developed in a  WHO expert meeting in 527 
2005, where participants considered the list of all antimicrobial classes used in human medicine 528 
and categorized antimicrobials into three groups of critically important, highly important, and 529 
important based on two criteria that describe first the availability or not of alternatives to the 530 
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antimicrobial for treatment of serious bacterial infections in people, and second if the 531 
antimicrobial is used to treat infections by (1) bacteria that may be transmitted to humans from 532 
nonhuman sources, or (2) bacteria that may acquire resistance genes from nonhuman sources. 533 
The output of the qualitative assessment is a list of classes of drugs that met all three of a set of 534 
defined priorities. Since its original publication, the assessment has been revised several times 535 
and is now in its 5th edition. 536 
Semi-quantitative risk assessments 537 
One example of a semi-quantitative assessment is the study integrating a probabilistic 538 
quantitative risk assessment conducted in Denmark to assess the human health risk of macrolide-539 
resistant Campylobacter infection associated with the use of macrolides in Danish pig production 540 
(82). This model was able to account for exposure through imported and domestic meat (i.e. that 541 
could be a vehicle for antimicrobial resistant bacteria as a consequence of antimicrobial drug use 542 
in animal production in the country) and used evidence available at the time. One important 543 
feature of this study is that, while it measured exposure probabilistically and thus reflected model 544 
and data uncertainty, the final step of the risk assessment –risk characterization – used an ordinal 545 
scale and thus risk was described in a qualitative scale.  546 
Quantitative risk assessments 547 
Several quantitative risk assessments have been published since the early 2000’s. These include 548 
the high profile assessment of fluoroquinolone-resistant Campylobacter from chicken in the 549 
United States (US) (83), which ultimately prompted the Food and Drug Administration to 550 
propose withdrawal of the approval of the new animal drug applications for fluoroquinolone use 551 
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in poultry, an action that would prohibit fluoroquinolone use in chickens and turkeys in the 552 
country (84).  553 
Another early study employed probabilistic methodology to analyze the potential public health 554 
risk from Campylobacter jejuni and fluoroquinolone-resistant C. jejuni due to fresh beef and 555 
ground beef consumption (85). The model focused on the beef product at retail and modelled 556 
consumer handling in the kitchen, processing and consumption. The model estimated first the 557 
risk of Campylobacter infection through consumption of beef, and then the risk of treatment 558 
failure given infection, concluding an increased health impact due to resistance.  559 
In another study, a risk assessment followed the US Food and Drug Administration’s Center for 560 
Veterinary Medicine Guidance (86) and was commissioned by a pharmaceutical company to 561 
estimate the risk of human infection treatment failure associated with the use of an AM drug in 562 
food animals (87). The deterministic model included all uses of two macrolides in poultry, swine, 563 
and beef cattle. The hazard was defined as illness (i) caused by foodborne bacteria with a 564 
resistance determinant, (ii) attributed to a specified animal-derived meat commodity, and (iii) 565 
treated with a human use drug of the same class. Risk was defined as the probability of this 566 
hazard combined with the consequence of treatment failure due to resistant Campylobacter spp. 567 
or Enterococcus faecium. At the time, this microbial risk assessment had the advantage of being 568 
quantitative and thus more transparent when compared to previous assessments focusing on 569 
AMR. Thus, the authors highlighted several limitations, particularly with regards to data gaps on 570 
the probability of treatment failure due to the antimicrobial resistant bacteria and the probability 571 
of resistant determinant development. In contrast to many evidence and risk assessments 572 
conducted elsewhere, the results of this study lead the authors to conclude that current use of 573 
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macrolides in cattle, poultry, and swine create a risk much lower than the potential benefit to food 574 
safety, animal welfare, and public health (87). 575 
The same author published another risk assessment a few years later, applying a similar approach 576 
to estimate the risk of a different combination of antimicrobial-pathogen - fluoroquinolone-577 
resistant Salmonella and Campylobacter in beef in the US (88).  This approach was able to 578 
provide a better measure of uncertainty but was similar in its findings, concluding that the risk of 579 
health consequences in humans was minimal. 580 
The most recent quantitative risk assessment study published is also the more novel and 581 
promising of the AMR studies here reviewed (89). It considered the existence of environmental 582 
compartments resulting from sewage-treatment plants, agriculture production and manufacturing 583 
industries, and assessed their role in the maintenance, emergence and possible dissemination of 584 
antibiotic resistance. This study used probabilistic methods to assess the risks of antibiotic 585 
resistance development and neutralizing antibiotic pressures in hotspot environments. 586 
Importantly, this study presents a modelling approach to assess the selective pressure exerted by 587 
antibiotics in bacterial communities and to calculate antibiotic resistance development risks. 588 
While the described approach was exemplarily used to model antibiotic resistance risks in an 589 
intensive aquaculture production scenario of south-east Asia, it has potential to be applied to 590 
other cases, including other types of animal production, settings and drugs. 591 
3.4. Strength and weaknesses 592 
Microbial risk assessment is a science-based tool with proven benefits in supporting food safety 593 
authorities in policy making. It is hence aspired to continue its use in assessing the consequences 594 
for the consumer of the transmission of AMR genes /pathogens throughput the food chain. The 595 
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fact that it is a well-defined, stepwise-structured method facilitates its adaptation to the food 596 
safety challenge of AMR. However, several limitations have already been identified and require 597 
the joint focus of the scientific community, risk assessors and authorities. Examples of a few 598 
critical challenges are: 599 
    The definition of antimicrobial resistance is critical for the four steps of microbial risk 600 
assessment, and needs therefore to be well-established at the very start of a risk assessment 601 
study. Martínez et al. (2014) (75) explains the existence of several possible definitions of 602 
resistance, (namely clinical, epidemiological and operational), and two definitions of 603 
resistance gene (ecological and operational). The adoption of standard concepts and 604 
terminology is a requisite for the transparency of microbial risk assessment and an important 605 
part of its development. Although transmission of AMR genes and antimicrobial resistant 606 
bacteria may be perceived and have been defined as two separate hazards, it has also been 607 
recently suggested that the risk of AMR transmission to humans cannot be estimated unless 608 
the AMR gene pool and the presence and quantity of antimicrobial resistant bacteria that are 609 
able to colonize and multiply in the human body are both taken into consideration (69).  610 
 Exposure assessment often relies on available knowledge of the changes in the microbial 611 
hazard levels throughout the food chain, due to e.g. growth or inactivation. In the context of 612 
microbiomes and resistomes, it is difficult to model these changes, as the very composition of 613 
the microbial population (and corresponding AMR genes) may significantly change between 614 
“farm” and “fork” (90, 91). Consequently, microbial risk assessment for AMR is highly 615 
dependent on data collected at several points of the transmission pathway, both from the 616 
source(s) of AMR and from exposed human subjects.   617 
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  While new generation sequencing attractively provides a broad characterization of the 618 
presence and abundance of AMR genes in a particular pathogen or in the microbiome from a 619 
particular reservoir, it remains a challenge to determine variability of the resistome and of the 620 
potential to exchange AMR genes (i.e. presence of phage recombination sites, plasmids, 621 
integrons or transposons) between different pathogen strains (69). This knowledge is crucial, 622 
respectively, to assign the AMR genes detected with metagenomics to the corresponding 623 
bacterial hosts, and to account for the occurrence of horizontal gene transfer between 624 
commensal and pathogenic bacteria in a population. 625 
 Furthermore, an important challenge for the integration of metagenomics data in MRA is the 626 
harmonization of languages between the “omics” and the food microbiology communities 627 
(92). 628 
 Risk characterization requires knowledge of the relationship between a “dose”, resulting from 629 
exposure assessment, and a “response”, i.e. the adverse health effect of exposure. However, 630 
the infective dose and the modes of transmission of most of the antimicrobial resistant 631 
bacteria of relevance are still unknown (69), which represents an important knowledge gap 632 
for the development of microbial risk assessment for antimicrobial resistance. 633 
 Finally, a major limitation of the current microbial risk assessment frameworks is that they do 634 
not allow estimating the long-term impact of exposure to AMR. Particularly serious public 635 
health consequences of AMR arise when multiresistant bacteria emerge and become widely 636 
spread. There is therefore the need to develop microbial risk assessment methods that include 637 
a different characterization of the risk of AMR. In addition to immediate consequences to 638 
human health due to a single exposure to a antimicrobial resistant pathogen, it is necessary to 639 
estimate the likelihood that such exposure (eventually together with past and subsequent 640 
30 
 
ones, to the same or other types of AMR) will lead to the development of antimicrobial multi-641 
resistance in the future. Also, it is necessary to assess the potential of multi-resistance spread, 642 
to characterize the severity of the consequences of exposure to multi-resistance and to 643 
estimate the time from initial exposure to those consequences.   644 
 645 
4. Discussion and future perspectives 646 
Several position and stakeholder papers have stressed the need for improved quality and 647 
increased amount of data for risk assessment of AMR (see. e.g.(93)). These include e.g. data on 648 
antimicrobial use in animal production, AMR surveillance data in animals, foods and humans, 649 
and gene transfer and spread of AMR genes.  All data requirements apply for most source 650 
attribution studies, and thus are transversal to the methods described in this chapter. Likewise, 651 
many of the challenges to the application of these methods in the context of AMR are common to 652 
source attribution and risk assessment approaches (Table 1). 653 
Table 1. Definition, overview of methods and main challenges of source attribution and microbial 654 
risk assessment approaches. 655 
 Source attribution Microbial risk assessment 
Definition Partitioning of human cases 
of illness to the responsible 
sources (e.g. foods, animal 
reservoirs) 
Systematic and science-based approach 
to estimate the risk of microbial 
hazards in the production-to-
consumption chain 







 Case-control studies 
 Expert elicitations 
 Intervention studies 
 Semi-quantitative RA 
 Quantitative RA 
o Deterministic 
o Probabilistic 
Main challenges in the 
context of AMR 
 Hazard identification, e.g. the antimicrobial drug, the 
antimicrobial resistant pathogen or the AMR determinant 
 Lack of occurrence/prevalence data 
 Definition of the health outcome, i.e. infection with 
antimicrobial resistant agent, treatment failure (in case 
treatment is needed) or spread of resistance determinant 
between commensal and pathogenic organisms 
  Lack of 
epidemiological data 
 Establishment of dose-response 
relationship 
 Determining variability of the 
resistome and of the potential to 
exchange AMR genes between 
different pathogen strains  




The studies here described all show the importance of knowledge on 1) the most important 658 
sources and routes of transmission of antimicrobial resistant bacteria or AMR genes,  2) the 659 
actual risk for human health, and 3) the points in the transmission chain where interventions 660 
could be effective to reduce this risk. While all findings so far have been crucial to direct policies 661 
and raise awareness to the public health impact of AMR in animals and foods, they are 662 
insufficient for a complete understanding of the underlying transmission mechanisms and the real 663 
impact of AMR. Several challenges have been addressed, including the fact that emergence and 664 
spread of AMR is complex. From an epidemiological point of view, the risk of AMR most 665 
probably follows the “sufficient-component causes” principle (94) . The sufficient-component 666 
causes is an epidemiological causal modeling approach that can be used to explain diseases, or 667 
conditions like AMR, characterized by many causes, none of which alone is necessary or 668 
sufficient. The relations among the causes are described in a way that a sufficient cause is a set of 669 
minimal conditions that will definitely lead to the outcome (e.g. antimicrobial resistant infection), 670 
and a component cause is one of the minimal conditions included in a sufficient cause (94). For 671 
example, a particular resistance gene can be a component cause of an antimicrobial resistant 672 
infection, but the sufficient cause of the latter includes other conditions, such as the bacterial 673 
strain carrying that particular gene, that pathogen causing infection, treatment of the infection 674 
with antimicrobial(s) for which resistance is encoded in the gene, and actual expression of that 675 
resistance gene. The future of microbial risk assessment for antimicrobial resistance may 676 
therefore include defining the components sufficient to cause AMR transmission from 677 
animals/foods/environment to humans followed by treatment failure of infections by 678 
antimicrobial resistant pathogens.  679 
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Recent developments in “omics” technologies (whole genome sequencing and metagenomics, 680 
transcriptomics, proteomics, metabolomics, fluxomics) provide unique opportunities to fill in 681 
some of our knowledge gaps. It is now widely recognized that these “omics” technologies have 682 
advantages compared to traditional phenotypic culture-based methods for characterizing 683 
microorganisms (92, 95).  684 
Brul et al (2012)(92) described in detail how “omics” can be integrated in each step of microbial 685 
risk assessment, contributing to a mechanistic insight into the interaction between 686 
microorganisms and their hosts, new perspectives on strain diversity and variability and 687 
physiological uncertainty, and overall more robust risk assessments. Den Besten et al. (2017)(95) 688 
discussed the utility of “omics” technologies applied by the food industry, to help identify the 689 
influence of different bacterial ecosystems on both pathogen survival and growth – information 690 
that can eventually contribute to the future definition of Food Safety Objectives (FSO).  691 
A particular advantage of metagenomics is that it provides a picture of the whole microbial 692 
community and its resistome, which is key to understanding AMR emergence and spread in a 693 
population. Importantly, these new “typing” techniques have been rapidly followed by new 694 
bioinformatics and new statistics/modelling tools that allow for the analysis and sense-making of 695 
such (big) data (92, 96). For example, machine learning has the potential to be applied on the 696 
analysis of omics data. Combining machine learning approaches with metagenomics and farm 697 
specific data could allow for describing e.g. health, production efficiency, and the relative 698 
abundance of AMR genes, based on the identification of (clusters of) genetic factors in the farm 699 
microbiome. In addition, such techniques could be used to examine the predictive importance of 700 
(clusters of) genetic factors in order to characterize 1) a ‘healthy farm microbiome’ or 2) AMR 701 
genes in a specific animal reservoir. They can also be used to identify (combinations of) specific 702 
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husbandry practices that are associated with e.g. a particular resistome or a ‘healthy farm 703 
microbiome’. The latter could lead to recommendations on how to shift the farm microbiome in 704 
order to improve the overall health of the farm, and consequently on the long term, to reduce the 705 
level of antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistant bacteria. It is possible that promoting a 706 
‘healthy farm microbiome’ will have a more long-term impact on the overall reduction of AMR, 707 
than focusing exclusively on the farm resistome. Metagenomics and other “omics” technologies 708 
have hence enormous potential for the future development of source attribution and microbial 709 
risk assessment of AMR through foods. To explore their full potential, different technologies 710 
shall be combined. For example, genomics studies should be coupled with proteomics, as gene-711 
expression studies do not always reflect the actual protein levels (92). Also, genomic similarities 712 
may not imply similarities in behavior, as the surrounding environment (food matrix, bacterial 713 
ecosystem, etc) also plays a role (95) . Furthermore, “omics” data are not sufficient without 714 
accompanying epidemiological data that allow for the identification of risk factors for AMR. 715 
5. Concluding remarks 716 
Recent developments in source-attribution and microbial risk assessment of AMR are promising 717 
and have significantly contributed to the evolution of each of these methods. However, the 718 
adaptation to the “omics” big data era is happening at a much slower pace than the speed at 719 
which these data are becoming available. This is due to the many challenges encountered when 720 
interpreting those data.   721 
Antimicrobial resistance at the animal reservoir, food, environment and human levels is 722 
increasingly described by the characterization of the resistomes of single bacteria isolates (by 723 
whole genome sequencing) or the bacterial whole community (by metagenomics) representing 724 
each of those populations. Gradually, AMR surveillance will convert from phenotypic to 725 
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genotypic (e.g. PulseNet International is already on its way to standardize whole genome 726 
sequencing-based subtyping of foodborne disease (96). For a successful transition, it is crucial to 727 
pair genomic data with phenotypic data and relevant explanatory epidemiological data. 728 
This transition will require a parallel adaptation of the existing analysis methods, which will 729 
include the development of new source-attribution and microbial risk assessment modelling 730 
approaches. It is therefore with great expectation that we foresee in the near future a surge of 731 
influencing and inspiring scientific output in both fields. 732 
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